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Like that of any other government, Moscow's policy on arms exports results from a 
struggle between various interest groups that represent and lobby for a number of large 
and small social, professional, financial, and political entities.
It might appear that in principle everyone here, apart from minor groups of committed 
pacifists, should welcome any contract for arms sales that generates hard currency 
profits for Russia. After all, the lion's share of Russian industrial exports consists 
precisely of weaponry and military technology as well as of dual-purpose technology 
produced at plants belonging to the military-industrial complex (MIC). The remainder of 
Russian exports is comprised of energy (oil and gas), metals, and raw materials. 
Despite this, at the present time there are powerful forces in Moscow that have an 
interest in strictly regulating and limiting arms exports.
Goskomoboronprom: For Expanding Arms Sales
It is only natural that the arms producers themselves are interested in exporting the 
maximum amount of weaponry. These include plants belonging to the MIC, as well as 
research institutes, design "firms," and the so-called scientific production associations 
that in the past designed and produced Soviet armaments.
In 1992, the Gaidar government sharply reduced procurement of new armaments, and 
severely cut expenditure on research and development. The following year the MIC 
received an even lower level of funding. In fact, the Russian government and the 
Ministry of Defense have not been paying even for the modest arms orders--compared 
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to the Soviet period--that had already been placed with Russian military plants. The 
government, specifically the Finance Ministry, is endeavoring to reduce inflation by 
limiting budgetary expenditures, while the Defense Ministry is giving priority to the 
maintenance of the armed forces--not to funding the military-industrial complex.
As a result, the MIC is now in profound crisis, and over the last two years the industry's 
leaders--plant directors and head designers--have been demanding a "free hand" to sell 
on the world market in order to save their plants from closure and to create new jobs. 
Within the Russian government, institutionally the interests of the MIC are represented 
by the State Committee on Defense Industry Branches (Goskomoboronprom), chaired 
by Viktor Glukhikh. The economy that the new Russia inherited from the Soviet Union in 
reality was a war economy. Many industrial cities in the Urals, Siberia, and Russia itself 
were military "company towns," and now these centers are experiencing profound 
economic depression and social disaster. The MIC directors in their lobbying of the 
Russian government are, of course, supported in every way possible by the oblast' 
governors and local administration heads. Moreover, the heads of regional 
administrations constitute a majority in the Council of the Federation (the upper house 
of the Russian parliament)--a fact that naturally strengthens their position.
However, two years of such efforts have not resulted in any significant liberalization of 
Russian arms exports. Indeed, as compared with 1992, this year the control exercised 
by officialdom (chinovniki) has become stronger rather than weaker. The plant directors 
and the head designers of Russian weapons systems continue to complain bitterly of 
"coercion by the bureaucrats" who are preventing them from selling arms abroad 
successfully.
Rosvooruzhenie: For Strict Export Limitations
Strange as it may seem, it is the professional arms traders themselves who are mainly 
interested in restricting arms sales, i.e., the very persons who sold tens of billions of 
dollars' worth of arms to Iraq, Libya, Syria, and other Soviet "friends" during the course 
of the 1980s. Today, practically all these professional arms traders work for the state 
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company Rosvooruzhenie ("Russian Armaments"), which has been exercising a virtual 
monopoly on arms exports.
Rosvooruzhenie receives a 5-7 percent commission on all export deals. Like any 
monopolist, this organization strives to reduce the quantity sold, while obtaining a higher 
price. These professional traders are resisting desperately all attempts to dump Russian 
arms abroad that may lead to a fall in prices, as well as any efforts by arms 
manufacturers to become independent actors in the world arms market.
At the same time, the officials of the Russian Finance and Economy Ministries have a 
vested interest in maximizing the budgetary revenue obtained from arms deals. 
However, the greediness they display in imposing high taxes frequently results only in 
reducing the volume of arms exports. For example, in recent months many joint projects 
with India, particularly for deliveries of spare parts and components, have practically 
come to a halt, since cooperation with India has become unprofitable for the plants of 
the MIC. The two-year $800 million credit granted by Russia to India in 1992 for arms 
purchases was not used up completely by the expiration date, so that during Indian 
Prime Minister Narasimha Rao's visit to Moscow last June the period was extended for 
a further two years.
The most disinterested warriors who are fighting against unrestricted Russian arms 
exports probably are the officials of the Foreign Ministry department that has 
responsibility for controlling the export of weapons and military technology. The Foreign 
Ministry does not receive any of the profits deriving from arms exports--instead, all it 
gets is the international unpleasantness that arises when Russia is accused of making 
"destabilizing" deliveries of armaments to some foreign country. It is precisely the 
officials of the Foreign Ministry who are making the most desperate efforts to combat all 
the attempts by the MIC to violate, for instance, the missile technology non-proliferation 
regime, or to get around international sanctions applied against certain countries.
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It must be noted that the Defense Ministry--above all the Russian Federation Armed 
Forces General Staff--is a consistent opponent of the untrammelled export of state-of-
the-art Russian weaponry. The top generals of the Russian Army do everything in their 
power to ensure that samples of the latest Russian armament do not end up in the 
hands of potential opponents.
At the present time, the Defense Ministry has no particular interest in increasing arms 
exports, since currently contracts with other countries allow the ministry only to receive 
payment for the training of foreign military personnel at Russian training centers.
Indeed, Russian generals find the sale of individual examples or small quantities of the 
latest weaponry to be especially unacceptable. The same applies to the transfer of 
military technology. In 1992, Voentekh, a company whose president is Gen. (ret.) 
Anatoly Funtikov, former first deputy head of armaments in the Defense Ministry, sold a 
single T-80U tank to the United Kingdom (as was widely reported in the press at the 
time), as well as one of the latest 2S-6 ("Tunguska") antiaircraft systems (about which 
much less was written). Gen. Funtikov told me that for the T-80 he had received 
$3,000,000, while for the Tunguska he was paid $6,000,000. This deal gave rise to an 
enormous scandal in Moscow. In the opinion of experts, the fact that the basic 
operational frequencies and other parameters of the Tunguska's radar became known 
inflicted grave damage to Russia's national interests, as well as greatly reducing export 
possibilities for the Tunguska. Nonetheless, at the time Voentekh's deal was completely 
legal.
As a result, at the beginning of 1993 an additional supervisory body, the Export Control 
Committee of the Defense Ministry (KEK MO) was created, chaired by First Deputy 
Defense Minister Andrei Kokoshin. This body includes representatives of the Foreign 
Ministry as well as all the agencies of the Russian intelligence community. Kokoshin 
recently told me that with the aid of the intelligence community the Export Control 
Committee had foiled several attempts made by plants of the military-industrial complex 
to sell the latest weaponry to China under the guise of earlier models.
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However, if they had had to act on their own, the ministry officials and the generals 
would not have been able to withstand the pressure exerted by the MIC and the 
regional governors. The MIC has a more influential as well as richer opponent in the 
shape of the raw materials and energy producers, notably the powerful plant directors 
from the oil and gas complex who prefer to sell their products on the world market. They 
have no wish to continue the Soviet practice of supplying the plants of the military-
industrial complex virtually for free, thus enabling the latter to manufacture large 
quantities of cheap armaments.
Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin, who represents the interests of the oil and gas complex in 
the government, referred contemptuously to the Russian MIC last summer at an open 
plenary session of the government, publicly asking, "Why make howitzers no one needs 
anyway and that no one wants to buy? "Any decision regarding the export of a large 
arms order invariably constitutes a compromise that emerges out of a lengthy internal 
struggle between different groups. This is the case especially if the deal is being made 
with a country that is a "traditional partner," and there is a problem of previous debts 
and mutual obligations. The representatives of the MIC are demanding that the Russian 
government forget about earlier debts--so that they can get some money today.
During a visit to Damascus last spring, First Vice Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets 
resolved all the fundamental issues that had been obstructing a renewal of Russian 
exports to Syria. Thus Russia agreed in principle to write off a major portion of Syria's 
previous massive debts to Russia. It should be noted that Soskovets is the most highly 
placed lobbyist for the MIC in the Russian government today.
Viktor Samoilov, the president of Rosvooruzhenie, told me, "Right now we are 
negotiating intensively with Damascus at the level of working groups on details of 
specific contracts." Final decisions may be made in October at a session of the joint 
Russo-Syrian Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation. Syria is mainly interested 
in buying the new S-300 antiaircraft systems.
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The representatives of the MIC are strongly opposed to any proposals to link the export 
of Russian arms to the problem of interstate debts. They note the following episode: 
Last year Russia delivered MiG-29 fighters to Hungary and Slovakia in payment for 
debts. The producers of these aircraft claim that they did not receive adequate 
reimbursement for the planes from the Russian government. Now Turkey and Finland 
also want to be repaid a portion of Russian debts in the form of arms. However, the 
directors of the MIC plants say that in future they are going to boycott such contracts.
RUSSIAN ARMS EXPORTS(1)
Value of Arms Exports
1992: $2.329 billion
1993: $2.504 billion
1994: $3.4 billion
(Estimate by Rosvooruzhenie)
Foreign Currency Receipts
1992: $4.24 billion
1993: $2.028 billion
The principal problem today lies elsewhere. As a result of the economic crisis and of 
increased domestic prices of energy and raw materials, the ability of the Russian MIC to 
produce competitive modern military equipment has been greatly reduced. 
Rosvooruzhenie representatives assert that today it is unprofitable to produce spare 
parts and munitions for export.
Further, the experts claim that in principle it is already impossible to restart production of 
many modern weapons systems, manufacture of which was halted during the course of 
the last two years--even if contracts were to be signed for foreign sales of such 
armaments. The representatives of the MIC are demanding financial concessions and 
subsidies for arms exports, but Premier Chernomyrdin is not sympathetic to such calls. 
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It cannot even be guaranteed that over the next few years Russia will be able to fulfill 
completely the export contracts that have already been signed.
Notes: 
1 These figures were obtained from an official government source on a confidential 
basis--P.F.
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